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Abstract
In this paper we compare a minisum and a minimax procedure as suggested by Brams et al.
for selecting committees from a set of candidates. Using a general geometric framework as
developed by Don Saari for preference aggregation, we show that antipodality of a unique
maximin and a unique minisum winner can occur for any number of candidates larger than
two.
We are grateful to Remzi Sanver for his helpful comments.
Citation: Eckert, Daniel and Christian Klamler, (2008) "Antipodality in committee selection." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4, No.
1 pp. 1-5
Submitted: November 30, 2007.  Accepted: January 12, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume4/EB-07D70014A.pdf1 Introduction
Recently, Brams et al. ([3], see also [2]) have introduced a minimax procedure
into the growing literature on committee selection and compared it with a
minisum procedure which is equivalent to the application of majority voting
on candidates to committee selection. They show that these two rules can
lead to the disturbing phenomenon of antipodality, i.e. to opposite oucomes
for one and the same preference proﬁle (for the use of antipodality in the
comparison of voting rules see Klamler [5] and Ratliﬀ [7]). Antipodality can
be seen as evidence for inconsistency of similarly plausible criteria that are
incorporated in diﬀerent rules. This is reminiscent of the inconsistency of
similarly plausible properties of aggregation rules in the typical impossibility
results in social choice theory. We extend the approach of [2] to a general
geometric framework as developed by Saari [8] for preference aggregation and
strengthen their result by showing that antipodality of a unique maximin and
a unique minisum winner can occur for any number of candidates larger than
two.
2 Formal framework and result
For a set of candidates, J, a committee can be represented by a vector of
binary evaluations x = (x1,x2,...,x|J|) ∈ X ⊆ {0,1}|J|, where xj = 1 means
that candidate j belongs to the committee and X denotes the set of all
possible committees. Geometrically, X is a subset of the vertices of a |J|-
dimensional hypercube. (Restrictions on the set X which are ignored here,
can guarantee non-emptiness and ﬁxed sizes of committees. On the other
hand, the absence of restrictions on the set of binary evaluations establishes
a certain analogy to approval voting.1)
The full preferences of the individuals over committees are derived from
their top preferred committees and the Hamming distance. For any two com-
mittees x,y ∈ X , the Hamming distance d(x,y) is the number of components
(candidates) in which they diﬀer. This means for example that the distance
between the committees x = (1,0,0,0) and y = (0,1,0,1) is d(x,y) = 3.
Hence, an individual with top preferred committee z, considers committee x
at least as good as committee y if d(x,z) ≤ d(y,z).
A voting proﬁle for this problem of committee selection is a vector p =
(p1,p2,...,p|X|) which associates with every binary evaluation xk ∈ X the
fraction pk of individuals for which xk is the top preferred committee, where
1This analogy is further explored by Brams et al. in [4].
1P|X|
i=1 pi = 1. A major advantage of this geometric representation of proﬁles
lies in the fact that the number of individuals need not be ﬁxed.
A committee selection rule is a mapping that assigns to every proﬁle
p = (p1,p2,...,p|X|) a committee x = f(p).2
In our framework, for any proﬁle p = (p1,p2,...,p|X|) the outcome of
majority voting on candidates Mx = MV (p) is deﬁned as follows:
For all candidates j ∈ J,
Mx






Following [2], the application of majority voting on candidates to com-
mittee selection is equivalent to the distance minimizing rule of minisum.
Obviously, for any proﬁle p = (p1,p2,...,p|X|), the minisum outcome Mx
is the committee that, among all y ∈ X, minimizes
P|X|
i=1 pid(xi,y). Thus,
the minisum committee selection incorporates an eﬃciency principle in the
utilitarian sense of sum-eﬃciency (see Moulin [6]).
Now, the minimax procedure introduced by Brams et al. [2] selects the
committee that minimizes the maximal distance to the individuals’ most
preferred committees. The major signiﬁcance of this selection procedure lies
in guaranteeing fairness in the well established Rawlsian sense of making the
worst oﬀ individual as well oﬀ as possible. Hence we deﬁne for any proﬁle
p = (p1,p2,...,p|X|) the minimax outcome Sx = MM(p) as the outcome
that, among all y ∈ X, minimizes maxd(xk,y) for all k such that pk > 0.
The comparison of the minisum outcome Mx and the minimax outcome
Sx exhibits the disturbing phenomenon of antipodality of the respective out-
comes, i.e. there exist proﬁles for which Mxj = 0 if and only if Sxj = 1.
Example 1 The following table states a proﬁle of binary evaluations with
J = 4 candidates and N = 19 voters.
Looking at candidate 1, we see that she is supported by 10 out of the 19
voters. Hence majority voting gives Mx1 = 1. The same applies to candidate
2, whereas candidates 3 and 4 are supported by only 9 voters, therefore Mx3 =
Mx4 = 0 and thus Mx = (1,1,0,0). Now, if we look for the minimax outcome
it turns out that there are individuals with every valuation but (1,1,0,0). So
for every valuation other than (0,0,1,1) there exists an individual that has
exactly the opposite valuation and therefore the minimax distance would be
2Possible restrictions on the codomain of the committee selection rule, such as ﬁxed
numbers of committee members or the exclusion of certain combinations of members are
again ignored here. On the other hand, our framework makes the size of the committee
endogeneous.
2# voters evaluation # voters evaluation # voters evaluation
1 0000 1 1010 2 1110
2 1000 1 1001 2 1101
2 0100 1 0110 1 1011
1 0010 1 0101 1 0111
1 0001 1 0011 1 1111
Table 1: Proﬁle with 19 voters
4. As there is no individual with binary evaluation (1,1,0,0) however, an
outcome of (0,0,1,1) must minimize the maximal distance to the individual
evaluations as such a maximum is 3. Hence Sx = (0,0,1,1). Obviously Mx
and Sx are antipodal, in the sense that the Hamming distance between these
evaluations is maximal because for all candidates j ∈ {1,2,3,4} Mxj = 0 if
and only if Sxj = 1.
The above example can be extended to any number of candidates. For
the proof of our results we use the geometric framework developed by Saari
[8] for the analysis of preference aggregation.
Proposition 1 For any number of candidates larger than two, there exists
a proﬁle of binary evaluations such that the minisum and the minimax out-
comes are antipodal.
The proof proceeds with the help of two lemmas.
Lemma 1 For any binary evaluation xk there exists a proﬁle p−k = (p1,p2,...,
pk,...,p|X|) such that pk = 0 and pi > 0 for all i 6= k, but such that
xk = MV (p−k) = Mx.
Proof. For any binary evaluation xk let {xa}k
a∈A⊂{1,2,...,|X|} denote the set
of the |J| adjacent vertices of xk and let pA
−k = (p1,p2,...,pk,...,p|X|) denote




|A| for all a ∈ A, where pl = 
is a small positive share for each other evaluation xl. As xa is a neighbor
of xk if and only if d(xa,xk) = 1, for each component j ∈ J, there are
|J| − 1 evaluations having xj
a = x
j
k ∈ {0,1}. For  being suﬃciently small
and |J| ≥ 3 this implies that Mxj = 1 if and only if x
j
k = 1 and hence the
lemma is true.
3Lemma 2 For any k ∈ {1,2,...,|X|} and for any proﬁle p−k = (p1,p2,...,
pk,...,p|X|) such that pk = 0 and pi > 0 for all i 6= k, xk = MM(p−k), where
xk denotes the antipodal evaluation of xk, i.e. x
j
k = 1 if and only if x
j
k = 0.
(The easy proof of this lemma being left to the reader.)
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider any binary evaluation xk ∈ X.
By lemma 1 it can be obtained as the minisum outcome of some proﬁle
p−k = (p1,p2,...,pk,...,p|X|). By lemma 2 the minimax outcome of p−k is xk,
the antipodal valuation of xk.
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